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None of the four Ukrainian presidents integrated their domestic policies towards the goal of EU 
membership instead preferring to wait for a signal of membership from Brussels. There were 
notable differences between Yushchenko, who was ideologically committed to NATO and EU 
membership and Yanukovych who is the first Ukrainian president not to seek NATO 
membership. Despite rhetoric in support of EU membership President Yanukovych is not 
ideologically committed to move beyond a Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA). The Yanukovych administration seeks to conserve its political and military monopoly 
of power in a semi-authoritarian regime inside the DCFTA which would be the maximum 
integration into the EU that it would seek. Party of Regions foreign policy spokesman Leonid 
Kozhara explained that Yanukovych has not raised the issue of EU membership because there 
was no need to as the DCFTA would provide Ukraine with four ‘privileges of the EU’ (free 
movement of capital, goods, services and people). ‘And after receiving these four freedoms we 
can speak about the fact that our country in effect became a member of the European Union 
without formal membership,’ Kozhara said1. 
None of Ukraine’s four presidents have undertaken democratic, economic and social reforms in 
lieu of the absence of a membership offer from the EU. Indeed, only Yushchenko of Ukraine’s 
four presidents has presided over a democratic administration. Corruption, especially in the 
notoriously non-transparent energy sector, has never been seriously tackled by any of Ukraine’s 
four presidents. 
There are two reasons for the virtual nature of the West’s dialogue with Ukraine. The first is 
institutional as the EU has  until now only been willing to use ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ in 
‘enlargement-heavy’ (i.e. full membership) whereas it has only used ‘carrots,’ but never ‘sticks’, 
in ‘enlargement-light’ (i.e. the DCFTA).  European Council Foreign Relations Senior Fellows 
Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson argue that the EU should be more willing to use both carrots 
and sticks; that is integrating its soft and hard power. The second is a disconnection between the 
West and Kyiv over definitions of democracy. The Ukrainian authorities have until now wanted 
to have their cake and eat it, too; rolling back democracy in Kyiv while claiming to sign up to 
‘European values’ in Brussels.   
EU-Ukraine Relations since the Orange Revolution 
In May 2008, following the EU’s enlargement four years earlier, the Eastern Partnership was 
presented by the foreign minister of Poland with assistance from Sweden and inaugurated in 
Prague the following May. The Eastern Partnership provides an institutionalized forum for 
discussing visa agreements, DCFTA and AA with the EU's eastern neighbors: Belarus, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (but not Russia).
 
The 2007-10 Tymoshenko government laid the groundwork for Ukraine’s membership of the 
WTO in May 2008 which opened up negotiations for a DCFTA. In November 2009, the EU-
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Ukraine Cooperation Council adopted the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda which replaced the 
former Action Plan, and will prepare for and facilitate the entry into force of the new AA, of 
which the DCFTA is a component. A list of priorities for action was jointly agreed by Ukraine 
and the EU for 2010.   
EU-Ukraine Relations under Yanukovych 
Ukraine’s relations with the EU have gone through three stages since Yanukovch’s election. The 
first and second stages were a credit of trust to the newly elected Yanukovych followed by 
disillusionment as the EU came to understand that there was a growing incompatibility between 
the rhetoric of his administration’s support for EU integration and domestic policies. The third 
current stage of EU-Ukraine relations is one of uncertainty as international organizations and 
Western governments are increasingly critical of democratic regression in Ukraine. Although the 
Yanukovych administration has chosen a DCFTA over the CIS Customs Union it has yet to 
choose to support ‘European values’ at home.  
In October 2010, the Ukrainian parliament voted down a resolution to seek EU membership 
when the pro-presidential coalition refused to support the motion.  A May 2011 resolution was 
though adopted by parliament that supported continued negotiations towards a DCFTA while 
simultaneously seeking mutual advantages from cooperation with the CIS Customs Union. A 
month later a presidential decree established a Working Group to develop Ukraine’s relations 
with the Customs Union on the basis of 3 (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) +1 (Ukraine).   
Why the Rush to Sign a DCFTA? 
Both Ukrainian and EU officials continue to raise hopes that they will sign a DCFTA by the end 
of this year, perhaps at the EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv in December. Poland, which has the EU 
presidency in the second half of 2010, may be interested in claiming this as an ‘achievement.’ If 
true it would be a pyrrhic victory.  
During the 2010-11 negotiations for a DCFTA the EU, European Parliament, US and 
international organizations have increasingly raised the issue of democratic regression in 
Ukraine. There would therefore seem to be an innate contradiction between the EU’s rush to sign 
a DCFTA at the same time as Ukraine is moving away from ‘European values.’ Anchoring 
Ukraine inside a DCFTA, while not the same as bringing Ukraine into EU membership would 
bring immense benefits to the country but these should not come at the expense of turning a 
blind eye to the very European democratic values that the EU espouses.  
In May 2011 the EU unveiled ‘A new and ambitious European Neighborhood Policy’ in which it 
stated: ‘A functioning democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law are fundamental 
pillars of the EU partnership with its neighbors.’ The EU’s new policy guidelines define ‘deep 
and sustainable democracy’ as including ‘free and fair elections; freedom of association, 
expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an 
independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law 
enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control 
over armed and security forces.’2 
By the EU’s own admission, Ukraine’s implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda 
priorities for 2010
3
  was poor. The report found that Ukraine had regressed in all five areas the 
EU understands to be crucial to a ‘deep and sustainable democracy.’ 
The EU’s conclusions were backed by Ukrainian civil society groups in a report sponsored by 
the International Renaissance (Soros) Foundation. The report gave Ukraine a scorecard of only 8 
out of 70 priority areas that had been implemented from the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda.  
With the rapid trajectory of Ukraine’s democratic regression under Yanukovych the EU could be 
faced with the likelihood that Ukraine will become an authoritarian regime inside the DCFTA a 
factor which would render its Eastern Partnership defunct. As Amanda Paul of the European 
Policy Centre noted, ‘If the EU fails with Ukraine it would represent a failure of the entire 
policy.’4 
The Economist warned there were two buzzwords in Brussels:  “no more Cyprus” and “no more 
Romania and Bulgaria.” This was because, ‘Most Eurocrats agree that the EU’s two newest 
members, struggling with corruption and organized crime, were let in too soon. Entry 
requirements have since been toughened, raising complaints of double standards.’5 Tougher 
membership requirements have indeed been in evidence in the EU’s negotiations with Croatia 
and Turkey but not over negotiations with Ukraine on a DCFTA and an AA.  
Political Persecution and the Selective Use of Justice 
The EU has repeatedly stated its hope that the Ukrainian authorities will adhere to the rule of law 
in any court trials and following the brief detention of Yulia Tymoshenko in May 2011, a 
statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine 
Ashton said, ‘The EU will continue to underline to the Ukrainian authorities the need for respect 
for the rule of law, incorporating fair, impartial and independent legal processes.’6 Similar views 
were made by Michael Emerson, Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies, who 
asked ‘Will it be conducted according to the highest standards of legal practice, including 
transparency and objectivity of proceedings and independence of the judiciary from politics.’7 
Such views give undue legitimacy to Ukraine’s notoriously corrupt and politically influenced 
judicial system where there is no respect for the rule of law and therefore Tymoshenko could 
never hope to receive a free trial in Ukraine. 
The authorities’ use of politics intimidates Ukrainian society and reduces their willingness to 
become active in politics and civil society. Repression is evident to Ukrainians half of whom 
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believe the authorities are undertaking political repression, according to a June 2011 poll 
conducted by the Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies.
8
 During negotiations 
conducted in 2010-11 for a DCFTA, additional politically inspired criminal charges were laid 
against former Prime Minister Tymoshenko, former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko and eleven 
other members of the 2007-10 Tymoshenko government, all of whom, except Tymoshenko, are 
in pre-trial detention. The Danish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights ‘has listed large scale 
violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.
9
  
Former Economics Minister Bohdan Danylyshyn was granted political asylum in the Czech 
Republic in October 2010. The charges are plainly absurd against Lutsenko, who has been 
imprisoned since December 20010 went on a hunger strike in May, for over-paying a pension to 
his police driver.  Other false charges are against nine leaders of fall 2010 anti-tax code protests 
for damaging floor tiles in Kyiv’s central square.  
As the additional charges against Tymoshenko, whose trial began on June 24, 2011, show the 
Ukrainian authorities have not taken any heed of repeated European and American criticism of 
selective use of the judiciary. On June 9, 2011 the European Parliament added another strongly 
worded resolution supported by all political groups except the Socialist political group who have 
a cooperation agreement with the Party of Regions. The European Parliament, ‘Is concerned 
about the increase in selective prosecution of figures from the political opposition in Ukraine as 
well as the disproportionality of measures applied, particularly in the cases of Ms Tymoshenko 
and Mr Lutsenko,’ and ‘Reminds the Ukrainian authorities that the principle of collective 
responsibility for the decisions of the government does not permit the prosecution of individual 
members of the government for decisions that were taken collegially...’  The resolution: ‘Stresses 
that ongoing investigation of prominent Ukrainian political leaders should not preclude them 
from actively participating in the political life of the country, meeting voters and travelling to 
international meetings...’10 
Five Steps to Rescue the EU from Itself 
First, the EU should slow down the pace of negotiations on the DCFTA and present clear red 
lines of impermissible behavior to President Yanukovych. If the Ukrainian authorities are 
unwilling to heed any EU and other Western criticism of democratic failings now, when Ukraine 
is outside the DCFTA, there is no likelihood they will do so when they are inside the trade 
agreement.  
Second, the EU should be more willing to use both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks;’ that is, integrate its soft 
and hard power. The October 2012 parliamentary elections will be a major test of the 
Yanukovych administration’s commitment to ‘European values.’ No DCFTA should be signed 
with Ukraine until after the 2012 elections are held and then only if they are declared by the 
OSCE and Council of Europe to have met democratic standards.  
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If the 2012 elections do not meet democratic standards, Ukraine would de facto become a second 
‘Belarus’ but inside the DCFTA. Freedom House warned “if left unchecked, the trends set by 
Ukraine’s current leadership will move the country toward greater centralization and 
consolidation of power – that is, toward authoritarianism.”11 
Third, the EU should make explicit that future elections will not be considered to have been 
democratic if the opposition is not permitted to stand. Selective use of justice, as seen by 
numerous resolutions by international organizations, has been the factor that has most damaged 
the reputation of the Yanukovych administration and any step in this direction would therefore 
greatly improve Kyiv’s relations with Brussels and Washington.  
Fourth, the EU should insist Ukraine continues to abide by its IMF program which has stagnated 
since late 2010. The government’s wobbliness resembles a pattern that has emerged over the last 
two decades whereby Ukraine only partially fulfills IMF agreements it has been forced to seek  
in 1994, 1998, 2008, and 2010.  
Fifth, by undertaking the above four steps, the EU would succeed in its policy of calling for 
inclusivity and transparency in Ukraine’s reforms process. The magnitude of the reform 
requirements that Ukraine would take on after signing the DCFTA can only be successfully 
implemented with the backing of the opposition, which has majority support in one half of the 
country, and with the cultivation of public opinion because many reforms will be unpopular. The 
Yanukovych administration’s attempts to undertake reforms while antagonizing one half of the 
country and without engaging with public opinion and civil society is doomed to failure. 
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